Thought-provoking, as ever. Two things spring to mind, though both are more orthogonal to the questions I think you find most interesting from Olson.
First, the idea of an exchange of taxes for public goods (really, defense from external threats) tracks very well what I (vaguely) remember of Japanese history. Local lords (daimyo) extracted rice production, and in (tacit) exchange warfare was the exclusive province of nobles, both daimyo and samurai. This example then makes me wonder, what is the incentive to develop social codes of conduct that restricted warfare in this way? Bushido in Japan and chivalry in the West both (to differing degrees) treated warfare largely as elite ritual, and it was sacrilegious for peasants to participate.
If we imagine that the stationary bandit wants to have the door open to fight as he pleases (by conscription, if need be) then these conventions seem to play against his interests. Maybe they could be considered part of the tacit exchange between peasant and lord? Peasants were usually the most superstitious about these things, and maybe unconsciously protecting themselves from having to fight by preserving and enforcing the taboo over time. But the taboo was equally strong (if not stronger) among other lords, who would (at least in the Japanese case) be charged with enforcing the taboo against one another, through demands of ritual suicide for example. And it's hard to imagine the peasant who refuses to pick up a sword for fear of offending God thinking that, long term, he's really benefitting his class. I have no answer to this conundrum, if it even exists!
Second, the discussion of dictatorship and democracy as to enforcement of private rights is just fascinating. I would love to know how dictatorships that historically get credit for maximizing economic growth and private property (at least in some quarters) handled private property disputes. What did contract disputes in Chile, Franco's Spain, and the Five Asian Tigers (though not uniformly dictatorships) look like? Was there a Chilean Baron Bramwell equivalent, who vigorously resisted any imposition on private property in the name of liberty while happily tossing the opposition in jail and throwing away the key? Again, no answers, just a fascinating thought.
Thought-provoking, as ever. Two things spring to mind, though both are more orthogonal to the questions I think you find most interesting from Olson.
First, the idea of an exchange of taxes for public goods (really, defense from external threats) tracks very well what I (vaguely) remember of Japanese history. Local lords (daimyo) extracted rice production, and in (tacit) exchange warfare was the exclusive province of nobles, both daimyo and samurai. This example then makes me wonder, what is the incentive to develop social codes of conduct that restricted warfare in this way? Bushido in Japan and chivalry in the West both (to differing degrees) treated warfare largely as elite ritual, and it was sacrilegious for peasants to participate.
If we imagine that the stationary bandit wants to have the door open to fight as he pleases (by conscription, if need be) then these conventions seem to play against his interests. Maybe they could be considered part of the tacit exchange between peasant and lord? Peasants were usually the most superstitious about these things, and maybe unconsciously protecting themselves from having to fight by preserving and enforcing the taboo over time. But the taboo was equally strong (if not stronger) among other lords, who would (at least in the Japanese case) be charged with enforcing the taboo against one another, through demands of ritual suicide for example. And it's hard to imagine the peasant who refuses to pick up a sword for fear of offending God thinking that, long term, he's really benefitting his class. I have no answer to this conundrum, if it even exists!
Second, the discussion of dictatorship and democracy as to enforcement of private rights is just fascinating. I would love to know how dictatorships that historically get credit for maximizing economic growth and private property (at least in some quarters) handled private property disputes. What did contract disputes in Chile, Franco's Spain, and the Five Asian Tigers (though not uniformly dictatorships) look like? Was there a Chilean Baron Bramwell equivalent, who vigorously resisted any imposition on private property in the name of liberty while happily tossing the opposition in jail and throwing away the key? Again, no answers, just a fascinating thought.